Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Consciousness and the Intermediate Level Fallacy by Manzotti, Riccardo & Chella, Antonio
HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY
published: 18 April 2018
doi: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00039
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org 1 April 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 39
Edited by:
Nadia Magnenat Thalmann,
Université de Genève, Switzerland
Reviewed by:
Leonid Perlovsky,
Harvard University, United States
Alessandro Di Nuovo,
Sheffield Hallam University,
United Kingdom
*Correspondence:
Antonio Chella
antonio.chella@unipa.it
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Humanoid Robotics,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Robotics and AI
Received: 30 November 2017
Accepted: 20 March 2018
Published: 18 April 2018
Citation:
Manzotti R and Chella A (2018) Good
Old-Fashioned Artificial
Consciousness and the Intermediate
Level Fallacy. Front. Robot. AI 5:39.
doi: 10.3389/frobt.2018.00039
Good Old-Fashioned Artificial
Consciousness and the Intermediate
Level Fallacy
Riccardo Manzotti 1 and Antonio Chella 2,3*
1Department of Business, Law, Economics and Consumer Behavior, Università di Comunicazione e Lingue (IULM), Milan,
Italy, 2 RoboticsLab, Department of Industrial and Digital Innovation, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy, 3Cognitive Robotics
and Social Sensing Laboratory, ICAR-CNR, Palermo, Italy
Recently, there has been considerable interest and effort to the possibility to design
and implement conscious robots, i.e., the chance that robots may have subjective
experiences. Typical approaches as the global workspace, information integration,
enaction, cognitive mechanisms, embodiment, i.e., the Good Old-Fashioned Artificial
Consciousness, henceforth, GOFAC, share the same conceptual framework. In this
paper, we discuss GOFAC’s basic tenets and their implication for AI and Robotics.
In particular, we point out the intermediate level fallacy as the central issue affecting
GOFAC. Finally, we outline a possible alternative conceptual framework toward
robot consciousness.
Keywords: robot consciousness, machine consciousness, artificial consciousness, synthetic phenomenology,
robot self-awareness
INTRODUCTION
Consciousness exists: we are conscious, and it would be odd to negate this fact. Consciousness is a
part of our physical world, and then the processes at the basis of consciousness must be faced by
the laws of science governing our physical world.
The definition of consciousness is still an open question. Therefore, it would be problematic to
discuss about robot consciousness: in facts, Raoult and Yampolskiy (2015) reviewed 21 proposed
tests presented in the literature to assess consciousness in machines and robots. However, the
same situation holds for other complex concepts: notably, Legg and Hutter (2007) review more
than 70 existing different definitions of “intelligence.” The fact that there is no agreement on what
intelligence is does not refrain researchers to speaking about Artificial Intelligence.
In facts, consciousness is an important research topic in neuroscience: Dehaene (2014)
summarizes several years of studies in human consciousness; see also Tononi (2012) and Damasio
(2010), among others. Notably, neuroscientists working on consciousness take seriously into
account the possibility that, in the near future, robots may be conscious. During the Symposium
organized in 2001 by the Swartz Foundation on “Can a Machine Be Conscious,” the concluding
remarks of Christof Koch stated that:
“we know of no fundamental law or principle operating in this universe that forbids the existence of
subjective feelings in artifacts designed or evolved by humans.1”
To the best of our knowledge, this claim is valid still today.
Consciousness is part of our physical world, and then some of its aspects may be studied and
even replicated by using robots. On the one hand, the employment of robots as tools may help to
1http://www.theswartzfoundation.org/abstracts/2001_summary.asp
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understand biological consciousness better, and, on the other
hand, the processes at the basis of consciousness may be in some
sense crudely replicated to build better robots, as it happened,
e.g., for neural networks and artificial life systems. Anil Seth has
claimed that:
“Over the last two decades much has changed [. . . ]. Alongside
philosophical discourse a new science of consciousness has
taken shape which integrates experimental and theoretical work
cross many fields including neuroscience, psychology, cognitive
science, artificial intelligence, computer science, neurology, and
psychiatry.” (Seth, 2010, p. 1).
It is not a case that the late Nobel prize Gerald Edelman, a scholar
of the research on consciousness, employed robots to validate
parts of his theory of consciousness (Reeke et al., 1990; Edelman
et al., 1992). Koch and Tononi directly addressed the possibility
that artifacts may be conscious by taking into account constraints
and conditions according to the Integrated Information Theory
of consciousness (see below). Notably, Koch and Tononi (2008,
2017) explicitly discussed and proposed tests for consciousness
in the machines. Recently, Dehaene et al. (2017) summarized the
neuroscientific findings of interest for conscious machines. We
concur with their claim according to which the study of biological
consciousness may inspire novel machine architectures.
In this direction, the paper by Grossberg (2017) summarizes
years of works about brain resonances and proposes a set of
models, described by differential equations, that captures some
of the main aspects of consciousness. Important papers in this
line are due to Perlovsky (2006, 2016) where he claims that a
new “physics of mind” is needed that looks for the fundamental
laws of the material world, including sentience. The new physics
of mind should develop the mathematical theories that explain
the empirical evidence about sentience and that generate suitable
predictions to be verified by experiments.
Therefore, the problem of consciousness in robots and
artifacts is an accepted issue for researchers in neuroscience.
In the AI debate, the problem of machine consciousness
has been discussed by many scholars since the seminal paper
by McCarthy (2002), where he considered an extension of the
Situation Calculus to deal with some aspects of self-reflection to
make robot conscious of their mental states. On a similar line,
McDermott (2001) devoted his book on “Mind andMechanisms”
on the discussion of a computational theory of consciousness.
Many journals and conference papers discussed the possibility
of consciousness in machines and robots by proposing theories
and architectures. Holland (2003) and Chella and Manzotti
(2007) collected the initial attempts at robot consciousness. An
almost complete up to date review is due to Reggia (2013).
Scheutz (2014) reviewed and discussed the contact points
between machine consciousness and artificial emotions.
Among the essential works from AI scholars concerning
machine and robot consciousness, we mention, among others,
the architectures based on the global workspace model of
consciousness (Baars, 1997) as the LIDA architecture (Franklin,
2003; Franklin et al., 2014) and the cognitive architecture
proposed by Shanahan (2005, 2006). A model of conscious
experience related to learning and sensorimotor interaction in
an autonomous robot has been discussed by Kuipers (2008).
Notably, Bringsjord et al. (2015) recently implemented a
cognitive system based on higher-order logic running on the
NAO robot that passed human tests of self-consciousness.
Therefore, robot consciousness is an important research
field that benefits from the contributions of many scholars
from neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and robotics. The
general feeling is, as stated above, that understanding biological
consciousness may help to build better robots and, on the
other side, that the research on robot consciousness may help
understanding biological consciousness.
This paper aims to propose a critical review and analysis of
the literature related to robots and machine consciousness under
the light of what we named the “intermediate level fallacy.” In
facts, many theories of machine consciousness actually do not
directly address the problem of consciousness, but they discuss
some intermediate problem, then leaving aside the issue of robot
consciousness.
Then, the goal of the paper is not to discuss a specific
algorithm or software, but to help roboticists interested in robot
consciousness to build a mental map of the bibliography in the
field and to avoid quirks due to the intermediate level fallacy.
GOOD OLD FASHIONED MACHINE
CONSCIOUSNESS
As previously stated, in recent years the notion of machine
and robot consciousness gained momentum and attracted
considerable interest. Chella and Manzotti (2009) discussed
many problems arising in the assessment of consciousness in a
robot concerning the role of the body, the needs for the robot to
be “situated” in an environment, the cognitive capabilities of the
robot, the effective functions of emotions and so on.
The most challenging problem for robot consciousness is the
possibility that a robot may have real subjective experiences.
However, many approaches at the state of the art in robot
consciousness are biased by a set of premises that harnessed
research into what can be named as Good Old-Fashioned
Artificial Consciousness (GOFAC).
GOFAC suggests a physical world in which consciousness
appears as a result of a specific intermediate level. A theory based
on the idea that consciousness emerges from an intermediate
level should explain what this level is and why it produces
consciousness. However, the explanation is problematic because,
rather than explaining consciousness, the theory introduces a
new level as an intermediate entity, that is only apparently less
troublesome. In contrast, the intermediate level is explanatory
disruptive since it adds two new problems: the characteristics of
the new level and its relation to consciousness. This approach
can be named the “intermediate level fallacy” and it seems to be
attractive because the introduced level appears less intimidating
and more familiar than consciousness itself.
This paper aims to list some of the leading approaches to
robot consciousness under the light of the intermediate level
fallacy. While each method has its peculiar shortcomings, they
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share the standard pattern, i.e., the intermediate level fallacy,
that characterizes GOFAC. They try to downgrade the notion of
consciousness to something more amenable—a move that does
not solve, but it multiplies the problems. After analyzing a series
of well-known approaches, the paper outlines a possible direction
in which research might go to overcome GOFAC.
This paper has not a negative goal, namely to list a series of
hypotheses and premises and stress the overall failure of GOFAC.
Instead, it aims to shed light on some, likely fruitful direction of
research.
THE HARD PROBLEM
The main culprit behind GOFAC is David Chalmers’s
introduction of the hard problem (Chalmers, 1996). According
to Chalmers’s seminal book, most of research and discussion
about consciousness has been carried on inside the conceptual
framework set by the contrast between a conscious mind and a
cognitive mind. Such a notion has entrenched the gap between
subjective, phenomenal experience and physical properties. The
hard problem—namely the idea that once all the material facts
are fixed, there is still something to be explained, has postponed
the understanding of consciousness and placed it outside of
robot implementation. If one accepts it, it follows that a robot
will never be genuinely conscious because no matter how all
physical facts are fixed, there will still be something to be added.
The acceptance of the hard problem is the main reason behind
the ensuing lack of progress in robot consciousness.
The hard problem is based on the premise that subjective and
physical properties are alien to each other. Moreover, yet, this
premise is not of experimental nature, and itmight be questioned.
In facts, if subjective and physical properties are different, then
it would be impossible to place them against each. Consider, for
example, the comparison between subjective red and real red.
There is no reason to believe there are two kinds of red. Of course,
the usual claim is that the subjective red is of mental nature and
the physical world is not accessible in a profound sense. Chalmers
claims that there are only subjective properties, or, to use an
equivalent and famous formulation, that we only experience the
phenomenal character of what happens.
This claim is unsupported by the facts that human beings
experience the external world and their own body. It is not
phenomenal; it is just what the physical world is. There are
no reasons to assume, as Chalmers does, that the perception
of the world is different from the physical world. There are no
perceptions of subjective properties, but instead, human beings
experience the attributes the world is made of, and the name we
can give to such characteristics is physical.
The hard problem is not empirically grounded because if it
were true, it could not be empirically proven. If consciousness
were hard, it could not affect the physical world. Conversely, if
consciousness were testable, it would not be hard.
The hard problem is related to the epiphenomenal conception
of consciousness, i.e., that consciousness has no physical role.
Accepting the hard problem means that consciousness will be
external to the domain of material facts. In fact, if consciousness
were part of the physical world, it could be measured, observed,
replicated, designed and implemented in a robot. The hard
problem encourages to conceive of consciousness as something
intractable by scientificmeans. Consciousness could not have any
effect on the physical world and, consequently, it would be useless
from a robotics perspective.
However, if consciousness is epiphenomenal, it would
contradict the selective advantage that it seems to provide.
Moreover, there are no other natural phenomena that are deemed
to be epiphenomenal. All physical events are causally relevant,
that is why they can be measured and observed them, as they
exert a causal effect. In physics and engineering, there are no
such phenomena because they would be automatically deemed
not to be real. The fact that GOFAC deals with consciousness as
epiphenomenal is the hallmark of scientific failure. Once inside
the traditional GOFAC framework, then consciousness is outside
of empirical reach.
The notion of epiphenomenal consciousness appears to be
a self-defeating hypothesis. Human beings as conscious agents
have a feeling that what they feel is interwoven with the physical
world. Consciousness is indeed a part of the physical world, and
if the current scientific picture of the world does not have a place
for consciousness, then it is not complete.
Nonetheless, the hard problem became famous also because
it contrasts the easy problems—how to explain the human
ability to recognize a face, generate language, control behavior—
from the hard problem of defining how physical processes can
give rise to consciousness. Such a split suggests, on the one
side, that scientists could continue their work without worrying
about consciousness and, on the other hand, that consciousness
is elusive and not constrained by the physical world. It also
provides engineers, roboticists, and AI experts free to design
robot consciousness as long as they were smart enough to leave
the hard problem aside and limit themselves to the easy problems
of consciousness.
In GOFAC, the hard problem spawned a split between hard
and weak machine consciousness (Seth, 2009) as though it
were possible to focus on functional and ontological problems
separately. Because of the widespread acceptance of the hard
problem, scholars assumed that conscious experience is out of
reach of science and technology and thus that a workaround
has to be proposed. The workaround was the delusion that it
is possible to focus on concrete problems—i.e., those that are
part of our conceptual framework—and to leave the real issue of
consciousness to some conceptual breakthrough.
The above state of things suggests that the literature on robot
consciousness does not deal with phenomenal consciousness.
Consciousness has been dropped from the physical world by the
hard problem, and thus it has been become legitimate to study it
without addressing the crux of the matter.
THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL FALLACY
Given the starting conceptual landscape shaped by the acceptance
of the hard problem—or some version of it—a widespread
tendency has been that of looking for some workaround. A
Frontiers in Robotics and AI | www.frontiersin.org 3 April 2018 | Volume 5 | Article 39
Manzotti and Chella GOFAC and the Intermediate Level Fallacy
common strategy has been that of the intermediate level which
is composed of two steps. First, an intermediate conceptual level
that is at a possible explanatory distance is proposed—behavior,
central workspace, information, enaction, adaptive resonance,
and so forth. Such an entity, crucially, is located on the physical
side of the gap but, equally significantly, it is somewhat vague,
to the extent that it may suggest some degrees of consciousness.
Second, consciousness is watered down to show that it is
not much better than the intermediate level. The second step,
which is most problematic from an ontological and epistemic
perspective, is critical to provide fulfillment of the first step.
As an example of the intermediate level fallacy, consider Seth’s
proposal to look for a real problem rather than for the hard or
the easy problem. According to Seth, the real question consists in
examining
“how to account for the various properties of consciousness
regarding biological mechanisms; without pretending it doesn’t
exist (easy problem) and without worrying too much about
explaining its existence in the first place (hard problem).” (Seth,
2016).
The real problem, according to Seth, is nothing but one of
the traditional easy problems in disguise. In this case, the
intermediate level is represented by the biological mechanisms
that are physical processes that do not qualify as a solution
to the hard problem. In this regard, Seth himself defended
weak machine consciousness (Seth, 2009). So, it is not clear
why the real problem according to Seth should be a successful
research strategy for consciousness. It is the second step of the
intermediate level strategy, i.e., watering down consciousness.
Seth’s catchphrase is that
“It looks like scientists and philosophers might have made
consciousness far more mysterious than it needs to be” (Seth,
2016).
Thus, he suggests that, after all, there is no mystery. In fact, Seth
argues that
“In the same way, tackling the real problem of consciousness
depends on distinguishing different aspects of consciousness,
and mapping their phenomenological properties (subjective first-
person descriptions of what conscious experiences are like)
onto underlying biological mechanisms (objective third-person
descriptions)” (Seth, 2016).
In his account, the problem of consciousness is no longer
that of tackling an apparently impossible feat for the physical
world, but a mapping between personal reports onto biological
mechanisms. This mapping may be tedious but feasible.
However, such amapping does not offer a solution of the problem
of consciousness. Both personal descriptions and biological
mechanisms are objective physical phenomena that pose no
threat to the received view of physics. Both of them do not
address the issue of consciousness.
Then, the first step of the fallacy is to suggest an intermediate,
safe level of explanation, like a suitable biological mechanisms.
The second step is to water down the problem of consciousness
to something more amenable as the mapping between personal
reports and the biological mechanisms.
CURRENT APPROACHES TO ROBOT
CONSCIOUSNESS
Robot consciousness has so far not succeeded in making
progress on the issue of phenomenal experience. While the
possibility of conscious machines, together with its ethical
implications, has repeatedly been addressed, no one has claimed
that anything close to a feeling has occurred in an artifact. As
before, this persistent and generalized lack of results might be
explained by the adoption of the familiar and flawed conceptual
landscape of GOFAC. In particular, the intermediate level
fallacy is a common problem in all these attempts. Here, we
will consider, as possible theoretical backgrounds for machine
consciousness, functionalism, information, embodiment,
enaction and cognition. We will argue that these approaches
exhibit the manifest symptoms of the fallacy and are as many
cases of GOFAC.
Functionalism
Functionalism is the backbone of the AI approach to
consciousness. Functionalist approaches single out a functional
view of the mind. This critique has been developed at length by
many scholars, most notably Searle (1990) and Harnad (2003).
If the mind is a collection of functional relations, no space is left
for what is taken to be consciousness—functioning vs. feeling,
to use Harnad’s formulation. Functionalism focuses on external
causal relations between the state of affairs. While functionalism
is neutral to the location of such causal relationships, it
concentrates mostly on abstract descriptions of reality, which is
the reason why it allows multiple realizations. Functionalism
is a theoretical description of what goes on in a system, and it
is oblivious to the physical constituents of a system. Therefore,
functionalism will never grasp consciousness because it is neutral
to the material components of functional relations.
Then, functionalism would provide the same description for
a system made of neurons and of electronic switches, and it will
offer the same explanation for a system with consciousness and
without consciousness. It is not a fact about consciousness; it is a
consequence of the premises on which functionalism is built.
Functionalism has been ideal to back up the philosophical
notion of a zombie, which was fundamental in all the accounts
inspired by the hard problem (Chalmers, 1996). A zombie is
an entity which externally is not distinguishable from a human
being, in the sense that it talks, it responds, it acts in the world,
but, contrary to a human being, it is entirely unconscious. The
conceivability of a zombie tells us more about the limitation of
functionalism than about consciousness. There is no evidence
that a physical entity identical to a human being might be
without consciousness. The notion of a zombie shows that
functional descriptions are incomplete and leave out something
crucial. In fact, in practice, all machines nowadays are considered
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philosophical zombies. No one expects Siri or Google Assistant
to be anything but zombies.
Many approaches to consciousness are functionalist models.
Consider the mentioned global workspace model (Baars, 1997)
and its implementations (Shanahan, 2005, 2006; Franklin et al.,
2014). Such a model is constituted by a suitable functional
structure where the information is lumped and broadcasted. The
first step is represented by the particular cognitive structure,
the central workspace, that is a neutral concept, and that
takes into account the notion of unity and the idea of a
central controller. The second step is the watering down of
consciousness, namely the claim that, to be conscious is nothing
but accessing information in a centralized fashion.
Another approach is the model of consciousness formulated
by Stephen Grossberg (2007, 2017) and based on adaptive
resonances in the brain. According to this model, the conscious
states in the brain are characterized as resonant neural states,
i.e., neural states where the firing of neurons are mutually
amplified and synchronized thanks to feed-forward and feedback
connections between bottom-up and top-down neural layers. In
this case, the first step of the move is represented by a suitable
characteristic of the dynamic evolution of a neural network,
i.e., the resonance of interconnected neurons, which is a neutral
effect that is explained by the differential equations governing
the dynamics of neural networks. The second step is the claim
that subjective experience is nothing but this particular state
in the dynamic evolution of neural networks. Of course, not
any rationale has been presented as to why centralized accessed
information or a resonant state could not be unconscious. The
presence of the fallacy is evident.
It is not to say that robots envisaged by functionalist designers
will never be conscious. In fact, designers, no matter what
conceptual frameworks they employ, when they move from
designing to implementations, are subject to the structure of
the physical world. Thus, their products are not limited by
their conceptual models. As consciousness is part of the natural
manifold, there will be cases in which the physical structure
of agents will yield to consciousness, no matter the conceptual
framework adopted by its designers.
Information and Computation
Another popular approach in GOFAC is based on seeking
unique information processes that produce consciousness.
Information, at the level of computational processes such as
those implemented by brains or by computers, is not a physical
constituent of reality. Instead, it is a convenient level of
description. Information is a fictitious entity, like a center of mass
or a meridian: it is not physically there, but it exists only in our
descriptions. It cannot be observed, but, significantly, calculated.
In the case of information, there is confusion among
scientists. The everyday familiarity with information has fostered
a widespread tendency to deal with information as though it were
real, like water or electricity. However, there is no evidence that
information is anything over and above the physical processes we
describe using an informational jargon (Shannon, 1948; Searle,
1984); it is nothing but a quantitative description of the causal
relations between events. From a physical perspective, there is no
need for an additional level called information over and above
the physical phenomena, but all the causal power is drained by
physical events (Kim, 1989, 1998; Dowe, 2000, 2007).
As an argument of the fact that information does not have a
physical existence consider that if information were real, it should
be possible to build an information detector. Interestingly, it is
not possible to construct an information detector. While it is
possible to compute the amount of information inside a system
from a set of assumption as to how that system is going to be
exploited, it is impossible to detect the amount of information in
a system. For instance, if one knows that a CD-Rom is going to
be read by a standard CD-Player one can compute its capacity.
However, if one takes a piece of matter and one does not know
whether and how its physical structure is going to be exploited,
one cannot know how much information it contains. The same
holds in all cases of similar information devices. It is not possible
to measure information as say, mass, electric charge, length.
Information can be estimated or computed based on what it is
known about a piece of matter and its role in a given context.
In sum, information does not exist except as a way to describe
what does happen between causally coupled events, coherently
with the original formulation of information (Shannon, 1948).
Information is a way to explain causal processes; it is not a real
phenomenon. It is not physical insofar it is causally redundant,
undetectable, never measured but only estimated. On top of that,
there would be no law explaining why a specific informational
state should be like a conscious state.
Information-based approaches to consciousness remain in
the intermediate level fallacy. The intermediate entity is now
information—sometimes a specific brand of information as in
Tononi’s integrated information theory (Tononi, 2004) and its
most recent version (Oizumi et al., 2014). The watering down is
the effort to claim that the properties of information are those
that matter for consciousness. For instance, Tononi claimed that
integrated information has unity and that consciousness too
has unity. Concerning quality, semantics, content, and all other
aspects of our experience, he does not have any word.
In sum, approaches like those suggested by Tononi and based
on the idea that information processing produces consciousness,
are empirically not founded because information has not a
physical reality. They are biased by the hope that a quantitative,
precise method may offer a scientific framework. In fact, these
authors emphasize the possibility to measure consciousness. At
most, these methods can succeed in estimating informational
states that correlate with consciousness, but, so far, they have been
unable to present justification as to why the informational states
under scrutiny should constitute consciousness.
Embodiment
In robot consciousness, popular approaches are related with the
notion of embodiment (Holland, 2004; Bongard et al., 2006;
Shanahan, 2006, 2010) mostly because they allow focusing on
robot bodies. It is a fruitful approach that highlights crucial
features of the embodiment. The body plays an essential role in
shaping the interaction between an agent and its environment.
Embodied cognition is a mandatory perspective regarding
sensory-motor loops. However, it is not clear why embodiment
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should provide clues on how consciousness fits with the physical
world. Inevitably, embodiment simplifies many critical sensory-
motor control loops.
If embodiment refers to the fact that a cognitive or conscious
process must be physically embodied, it is a pretty obvious
notion. A cognitive process must be embodied in this sense, as
any process must correspond to something physical and thus be
embodied. However, supporters of the concept of embodiment
as Chrisley and Ziemke (2006) mean something less trivial.
These authors compete against the traditional notion of
cognition as a higher order process carried on by a central
processing unit physically separate from the body. Such an
approach is the offshoot of historical factors—i.e., mostly, the
Cartesian notion of an immaterial mind, a functionalist model of
the mind, and the availability of electronic calculators well before
they could be coupled with artificial bodies. All these factors
fostered a disembodied notion of the mind and its processes.
However, they have long ceased to be relevant, both in the
philosophical debate as well as in the technological playground.
AI is biased by a Cartesian view of the mind. Embodiment
allowed AI scholars to emphasize the physical nature of agent
hood. However, this fact does not imply that the body is the only
constituent of an agent.
The notion of embodiment self-contradicts its original
intentions. In fact, the embodiment was taken into consideration
to get rid of the immaterial mind, as the body and its interaction
with the world appear like a feasible solution. Unfortunately,
the notion of “body” is unclear. Typically, an object is a body
only when it is the body of a subject. However, then, the notion
of the body is circularly the cornerstone of the subject. The
body is another intermediate entity that should bridge the gap
between world and consciousness. It is the symptom of the
intermediate level fallacy. The body—or its interactions with the
environment—is proposed as the intermediate level. At the same
time, the watering down step deals with the body as though it
were something more than a moving physical object. The last
step is, of course, of relevance in the case of robot consciousness
where researchers do not have a biological body. The features that
should be present in an object to be qualified as a body are not
explained. In this sense, a washing machine may be considered as
a body, because it reacts to external stimuli, it swallows stuff, it
processes it, it expels it, it consumes energy, it plans. The same
arguments hold for anthropomorphic robots (Holland, 2003;
Natale et al., 2012).
Thus, embodiment tries to exploit the intermediate level
fallacy by employing the ambiguous notion of a body, and to
water down consciousness to something more mundane as the
body.
Enaction
Another viable solution to achieve robot consciousness is offered
by enaction insofar as it suggests that experience is constituted by
a body and its interactions and with the world, and thus it may be
implemented in artifacts (O’Regan and Nöe, 2001).
Enactivism defends a firm stance that, together with the
embodiment is likely to be productive in many fields, most
notably cognitive science (Stewart et al., 2010). What enaction
has never addressed is the enactive level of reality and why there
should be anything like that—namely the first step of the fallacy.
Consider the basic tenet of enaction, in Alva Noë’s
formulation:
“Perceiving is a way of acting [. . . ]What we perceive is determined
by what we are ready to do [. . . ] We enact out perception; we act
it out” (Noë, 2004, p. 1).
Once again, Noë suggests an intermediate level based on actions,
that should underpin perception. Of course, he does not explain
why actions should be different in the case they are performed by
human bodies from the case in which they are performed by a
robot or an animal.
Enactivism does not provide a criterion to distinguish between
real actions and simple movements unless by reference to
subjects. In other words, an act is a movement performed by
a subject with intentions and understanding—i.e., a conscious
subject. Then there is the concrete risk of circularity in their
arguments. Consider this point in John Stewart’s formulation:
“How can a material state be a mental state? Hoary it may be,
yet the problem is anything but solved. [. . . ] The paradigm of
enaction solves this problem by grounding all cognition as an
essential feature of living organism” (Stewart, 2010, p. 1).
Of course, as Stewart himself admits, this does not solve the
problem. It only shifts the burden of the explanation on the
notion of the living organism. Since vitalism has long been
dismissed, the emphasis on life and living organisms does not
seem a convincing conceptual fulcrum. In this way, the suggested
intermediate level is the living organism and its feedback loops
with the external world. Why these phenomena should be any
special is left unexplained. It is the second step of the fallacy.
Finally, it is characteristic of enaction the shift from actions
as such to knowledge about actions. In fact, recent accounts of
consciousness in enaction take stock of the notion of knowledge.
In this regard, Noë claims that
“To be a perceiver is to understand, implicitly, the effects of
movement on sensory stimulation.” (Noë, 2004, p. 1).
Once again, an intermediate level, that of understanding and
sensory-motor knowledge, is presented as a way to reach
consciousness. What such an intermediate level is in a physical
world and why knowledge of the effects of movement on sensory
stimulation should lead to conscious experience is not clear at all.
Cognition and Intelligence
The most obvious candidate for consciousness is cognition and
intelligence. Here, we have a promising intermediate entity which
looks apparently less demanding, and we may consider whether
it might be the right ladder. After all, there seems to be a tight
connection between cognitive capabilities and consciousness.
Most of the time, when a human being exerts higher-order
cognitive processes are conscious. However, it is fair to maintain
that, in many cases, when one is conscious very little intelligence
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is required or that many of the most creative ideas have been the
outcome of mostly unconscious activities (Lavazza andManzotti,
2013).
It is a fact that many scholars are tempted to focus on
intelligence and cognition and expect that consciousness will
come for free once all the practical issues have been solved.
Alternatively, instead many hold that the problem will evaporate
as a false problem.
However, also, in this case, cognition is an intermediate
level that may lead to the knowledge of consciousness, and not
to consciousness experience. Also, this is a symptom of the
intermediate level fallacy.
WHAT IS LEFT?
We found a common explanatory strategy in the reviewed
attempts. Scholars working in robot consciousness suggest
an intermediate level—sensory-motor patterns, information,
cognition, global workspace—as a possible explanation for
consciousness. What is missing is why such a level should lead
to consciousness. From an epistemic perspective, it is as though
they suggested an explanans without providing its relationship
with the explanandum, i.e., consciousness. Table 1 summarizes
the different GOFAC landscapes of the intermediate level
fallacy.
The hard problem, the GOFAC approaches, and the strong
vs. weak machine consciousness argument are all grouped by a
common factor, as they all deal with consciousness as lacking any
causal role in the world. Consider for example the hard problem,
that leads to the issue of the zombie, a cognitively equivalent
agent lacking consciousness. In turn, GOFAC does not address
the issue of subjective experience. Finally, the split between
weak and strong machine consciousness was conceived to deal
with cognitive processing without addressing the crux of the
matter, namely conscious experience. Weak consciousness was
designed to deal with the functional aspects of consciousness—
i.e., those with causal relevance—and therefore to leave out
strong consciousness.
New hypotheses about the nature of the physical world
are needed. Consciousness is a fact that needs to find its
place in nature. Thus, if consciousness is neither of the
previously examined processes what is left? The proposal is that
consciousness is the structure of the physical world itself. Such a
move has been except in some cases, as in Perlovsky (2006, 2016).
There must be fundamental mistakes in the way the physical
world is conceived. A possible error might be the location of the
thing called consciousness in a different place rather than the
body of the agent or the neural/computational structure. Another
mistake might consist in the split between the subject and the
object. The paper shows that GOFAC will never achieve machine
consciousness and thus that it clamors for the adoption of a
robust conceptual framework alternative to the hard problem and
its cognates.
Of course, finding consciousness inside the physical world
is necessary when the goal is designing a conscious robot. A
robot does not have any other resource but those offered by the
physical world. It may sound like a platitude but, give or take, all
mentioned approaches run according to this principle. Therefore,
any viable solutions will require setting aside the premise that
has so far hampered any progress—i.e., the hard problem with
the general belief that consciousness is something distinct from
the physical world. We have to reconsider the question from the
beginning.
We believe it is possible to flesh out a radical alternative that
will stem from setting aside the obnoxious theoretical framework
fostered by the adoption of the Hard Problem. First, we take
consciousness to be just like all other physical properties around,
something that can be measured, observed. Furthermore,
consciousness is causally active and located in space-time.
Finally, it is made of matter or energy. These premises are
nothing more than restating the assumption that consciousness
is physical. In fact, everything that is physical is spatiotemporally
located, causally relevant, made ofmatter/energy, and observable.
So much the worse for epiphenomenalism and zombies.
Of course, this move will be considered unfeasible by most
scholars insofar as they take consciousness to be invisible in the
physical world. Neuroscientists have been looking for it inside the
brain for the last couple of centuries without finding anything
resembling it. In the brain, there is nothing like conscious
experience and thus neither will there be inside a machine.
However, the solution might require a conceptual leap.
Consider the possibility that consciousness, albeit physical,
is not literally inside the body of the agent—be it biological
or artificial. The proposal is that consciousness is the same
with the external objects an agent deals with. In this way, the
physical properties of the external world might be the same as
TABLE 1 | The intermediate level fallacy in different GOFAC landscapes.
Actual physical world Intermediate level Watered down version of
consciousness
Functionalism The physical states that realize functional
structures
Global workspace, centralized
representations, adaptive resonance
Access consciousness
Information and computation The physical states that transmit causal
processes
Integrated Information Integrated consciousness
Embodiment Objects Body states, body-world states Sensory-motor loops
Enaction Interactions between objects and
environment
Actions Knowledge of sensory-motor loops
Cognition Brain or processor Cognitive states Knowledge
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the properties of conscious experience (Manzotti, 2006, 2017;
Manzotti and Chella, 2016).
An example will help. An agent—i.e., a body either biological
or a robot—is interacting with an external object, say, a yellow
banana. Inside the agent there is nothing with the properties of
the banana—being yellow, being elongated, and being slightly
bent. When we look for the agent’s experience inside the agent’s
body, we would be compelled to conclude that there is nothing
physical with those properties inside the agent’s body (yellow,
elongated, bent). Not being able to find anything like our
experience inside one’s body, we may be tempted to conclude
that consciousness is indeed particular; that it is invisible,
epiphenomenal, not directly measurable, in a world, that it is
phenomenal. This option is taken by the hard problem and all
its cognate approaches.
We suggest an alternative. When the agent is interacting with
the banana, there is a physical entity that is ideally suited to be
the same with the agent’s experience, namely, the banana itself.
The banana is yellow, elongated and slightly bent, just like the
experience of it. Nothing else is to be invoked to be the experience
of the banana. The banana is better than anything we may ever
hope to find inside the agent. The external object scores better
than any internal representations.
The advantages of this approach as regards machine
consciousness are numerous. There is no need for biological
material. There is no need for the emergent property, a very
questionable addition to the debate. There is no need to appeal
to quantum mechanics, something still alien to the current
state of the art in robotics. There is no need to suppose
the existence of dubious properties that cannot be observed
physically. Everything is measurable, observable and, crucially,
causally relevant rather than epiphenomenal. An initial example
of this approach, implemented on a robot head, is described in
details in Manzotti and Tagliasco (2005).
DISCUSSION
Four possible objections can be anticipated to this proposal. First
objection: the object is not inside the body of the agent, and thus
it cannot be either constitutive or the cause of one’s experience.
This objection has been raised by one of the original proposers
of the extended mind, namely by Chalmers (2008). There is no
reason to assume that we are located in our head. The physical
location of experience cannot be derived from the fact that
sensor organs are found on the body. Only the location of sense
organs can be estimated by the position of what is perceived.
The physical location of consciousness is immaterial, though, as
Daniel Dennett’s clarified in his famous cautionary tale (Dennett,
1978).
Second objection: the yellow of the banana is not like the
yellow of consciousness, or to rephrase it, the physical yellow
is different from the phenomenal yellow. If we assume that
subjective properties are different from physical properties, they
could not be the same. This fact, however, is neither self-
evident nor empirically found. It is the premise on top of
which the hard problem framework got built, an assumption
that should be empirically demonstrated rather than assumed.
In fact, such a hypothesis is self-confuting—if the two classes
of properties were different, we could never see the physical
properties. The claim that physical properties are different
from subjective properties is unproven. The burden of the
proof lies on the shoulder of those who claim there are
additional properties. Historically, many scholars argued there
where subjective properties because they could not find anything
like our experience inside brains. However, external objects
are exactly like our experience of them. Therefore, nothing
prevents from being the same with our alleged experience of
them.
Third objection: the misperception as dreams and
hallucinations. Any realist proposal must tackle the issue
of misperception. How can the suggested identity between
consciousness and external object tackles cases in which
the object does not seem to be there? Our reply to such an
objection is that the scope of the present can be arbitrarily large.
Consciousness is made of objects that had causal intercourse
with the body of the agent and that, thanks to its neural structure,
are still causally active in whatever combinations they happen
to be. Consciousness is then always a form of perception,
albeit reshuffled and postponed. Of course, this issue alone will
require a lot more discussion, but the gist of the strategy is
there.
Fourth objection: if consciousness is the same with the
external objects, how can the same object look different to
different agents? A reply is the following—physical properties
are relative, and thus they can be different when compared to
a different physical system. The same object can have different
physical properties for different agents since different agents have
different bodies. The same vehicle can have different velocities
relative to different observers moving with as many frames of
references. So, the same object can have different properties
relative to bodies having different causal properties. The same
object will have different colors for tetrachromats, standard
trichromats, and color blind of various kinds. Thus, the relative
nature of physical properties paves the way to the fact that
the same object may indeed have different features for different
agents.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this article is to show the problems with GOFAC
and thus that it clamors for the adoption of a robust conceptual
framework alternative to the Hard Problem and its cognates.
Our proposal offers a new basis for robot consciousness.
There will no longer be an elusive property concocted by some
particular process inside the body of a robot agent; neither will
it be a hard problem. Consciousness is the network of objects
and events that, thanks to a body with sensory-motor-cognitive
capability are brought to interact together. Consciousness is
not an internal property, but the collection of objects that,
thanks to the body, are causally responsible for what the body
does. The study of robot consciousness will thus shift the focus
from internal processes and structures to the analysis of the
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ontogenetic and epigenetic relations that a body develops and
maintains with the external world during its life. Methodologies
of developmental robotics (Cangelosi and Schlesinger, 2015) will
be a valuable help in this effort.
The presented hypothesis, albeit still in its infancy, offers
a complete physicalist alternative—conscious robots would be
machines that bring into existence the same relative physical
objects human bodies do.
The advent of a conscious robot would eventually lead
to new questions about what it means to be a person. The
concept of person undergone inclusive variations over the
centuries, as discussed by Gunkel (2012). Humanity has come
across many problems to include women, slaves and superior
mammals in the circle of persons. Today, the problem is
two-fold: if we assert that a robot is a kind of person, then
the moral responsibility of the robot for its actions must
be recognized. On the other side, we have to concede some
moral rights to the robot, such as the right of not being
switched off.
The concept of person is tightly linked to the concept of
consciousness. If an entity can have subjective experiences, and
eventually can suffer, then this entity should be treated as a
person. In this regard, the studies on robot consciousness may
force us to review our fundamental definition of the concept of
person.
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